verypossiblyfallacious.blogspot.com
Sophomoric Non-sequiturs: Wrong on Metaphysics, Wrong on Ethics, Wrong for America.
http://verypossiblyfallacious.blogspot.com/2007/12/wrong-on-metaphysics-wrong-on-ethics.html
If P, then Q. P. Therefore you must read this blog. Saturday, December 8, 2007. Wrong on Metaphysics, Wrong on Ethics, Wrong for America. This is about the funniest thing I've seen in months. Thanks to Crooked Timber. For bringing this to my attention. Edited: now it's on Leiter. Too Philosophical wildfire, this is. Subscribe to: Post Comments (Atom). Pittsburgh, PA, United States. Grad Student. Procrastinator. Aspiring Philosopher and Unemployable Academic. View my complete profile.
mindworkshop.blogspot.com
Philosophy of Mind Workshop: I Take A Stance; There is a World
http://mindworkshop.blogspot.com/2009/06/i-take-stance-there-is-world.html
Sunday, June 21, 2009. I Take A Stance; There is a World. A provocative argument discussed during Zed Adams's. Recent presentation to the Mind Workshop, "Color Relativism". Posted by Nat Hansen. Please note that this argument pretty clearly presupposes an I that is a transcendental subject, that is not itself part of the world. Among other things, one might worry about that part of the argument. Subscribe to: Post Comments (Atom). View my complete profile. 2006-2007) David Velleman, Self to Self.
mindworkshop.blogspot.com
Philosophy of Mind Workshop: Naming and Necessity, Lecture I
http://mindworkshop.blogspot.com/2005/04/naming-and-necessity-lecture-i.html
Tuesday, April 05, 2005. Naming and Necessity, Lecture I. On Thursday the largest group of students in workshop history assembled to discuss lecture I of Naming and Necessity. The group included several prospective graduate students. We had nicer beer this time to complement the larger numbers- Becks and Heineken instead of the usual Schlitz and Old Style. 2 There was a long discussion of the contingent a priori. Several people worried that stipulation does not extend our knowledge. We focused on...2004-...
olasov-over.blogspot.com
Think It Over: Two Types of Lexical Ambiguity?
http://olasov-over.blogspot.com/2008/10/two-types-of-lexical-ambiguity.html
Tuesday, October 7, 2008. Two Types of Lexical Ambiguity? I have my worries about the effectiveness of this case in support of Recanati's larger argument, but I'll assume the analysis for now. The situation is that intransitive "eats" refers to eats1 (or the property whose extension is eats1) and transitive "eats" refers to eats2 (or the relation whose extension is eats2). Is "eats" (lexically) ambiguous? The sentence has no (surface) structure to speak of. 1) If he eats an apple a dollar. We can imagine...
verypossiblyfallacious.blogspot.com
Sophomoric Non-sequiturs: December 2007
http://verypossiblyfallacious.blogspot.com/2007_12_01_archive.html
If P, then Q. P. Therefore you must read this blog. Friday, December 21, 2007. Reviewing, It's a Tough Job, But Someone's Got to Do It. Ah, it's that time again. Time to review submissions for the Pitt CMU grad conference. I have two this year, and upon scanning them, they look far less depressing than the ones I've read in the last two years. But I won't get my hopes up just yet. And so, dear audience of one (two? I ask: Do you think that graduate student submissions to conferences are generally poor?
mindworkshop.blogspot.com
Philosophy of Mind Workshop: Making It Explicit, Chapter 3, Parts III & IV
http://mindworkshop.blogspot.com/2006/01/making-it-explicit-chapter-3-parts-iii.html
Thursday, January 26, 2006. Making It Explicit, Chapter 3, Parts III and IV. Last night the workshop met to discuss the last two sections of chapter 3 in Making It Explicit. Thanks again to Russell for taking me to get the provisions for the workshop. Pictured: three dimensions of assertional significance). David F. gave the introduction tonight. His raised a number of different questions for consideration. Reasons is obviously to beg the question. Is in the quote just given. Shouldn't it be the case...
mindworkshop.blogspot.com
Philosophy of Mind Workshop: Making It Explicit, Chapter One (part VI) & Chapter Two (parts I-III)
http://mindworkshop.blogspot.com/2005/11/making-it-explicit-chapter-one-part-vi.html
Wednesday, November 09, 2005. Making It Explicit, Chapter One (part VI) and Chapter Two (parts I-III). Tonight the workshop met in Cobb 103 to discuss the last part of chapter one and the first three parts of chapter two of Brandom's Making It Explicit. David F. wasn't at the workshop tonight because he was sick, but Jason B. did an admirable job steering the workshop in the direction of the truth. Or at least the truth about Brandom. On the face of it, this looks paradoxical. Surely no (or very few) con...
mindworkshop.blogspot.com
Philosophy of Mind Workshop: Making It Explicit, Chapter 4, Parts I and II
http://mindworkshop.blogspot.com/2006/02/making-it-explicit-chapter-4-parts-i_13.html
Monday, February 13, 2006. Making It Explicit, Chapter 4, Parts I and II. Last Wednesday the workshop met to discuss parts I and II of chapter 4 of Brandom's Making It Explicit. Jason kicked things off again with a short intro to Brandom's account of observational knowledge and knowledge in general. Brandom wants to give an account of both in terms of the varieties of his deontic statuses of commitment and entitlement. Ascribing. Knowledge is taken as the basic explanandum. Finally, I myself. Undetake a ...
mindworkshop.blogspot.com
Philosophy of Mind Workshop: Skepticism Update
http://mindworkshop.blogspot.com/2009/07/skepticism-update.html
Thursday, July 02, 2009. Tijuana is a bad place to be, epistemically speaking, if you're trying to identify a Zebra. And it appears that someone found an actual barn façade not attached to a barn. Posted by Nat Hansen. Subscribe to: Post Comments (Atom). View my complete profile. 2006-2007) David Velleman, Self to Self. 2006) J.L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia. 2005-2006) Robert Brandom, Making It Explicit. 2005) Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity. 2004-2005) David Wiggins, Sameness and Substance.
